The war in Vietnam claimed the lives of five million of its citizens, many of whom died in ways thought to have turned them into malevolent spirits who prey on the living. These angry ghosts are held responsible for a host of physical ailments and other misfortunes suffered by survivors of the war and their descendants. Known in the anthropological literature as possession illness, the cross‐cultural treatment for such maladies is typically provided by practitioners like mediums and exorcists, who cure (...) victims by interacting with noncorporeal entities. In Vietnam, such spirit healers were banned after the communist takeover of the North in 1945. This has posed a problem for the large numbers of Vietnamese who suffer from ghost‐induced sickness. This paper focuses on three victims of angry ghosts, presenting the common origin, context, and resolution of their suffering. In doing so, it provides an overview of Vietnamese beliefs about death and the after‐life, the ideal relationship between the living and the dead, and the connection between state politics and spirit practice. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à dégager les enjeux de la cosmologie dans le système naturel aristotélicien. On commencera par relever certains paradoxes, comme l’absence de la cosmologie dans le programme scientifique d’Aristote. L’objet du De Caelo sera examiné dans cette perspective. On exposera dans un second temps les difficultés méthodologiques d’une enquête portant sur la nature du tout à la lumière de l’épistémologie aristotélicienne. L’étude de la démarche du Stagirite permettra ainsi de distinguer deux conceptions du monde : le monde comme (...) totalité statique des corps ( pan ou holon ) et le monde comme principe de leur organisation dynamique ( cosmos ). La cosmologie aristotélicienne se confondra dès lors avec l’étude de la structure formelle du mouvement éternel, s’intégrant ainsi dans une étude générale du mouvement. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation between version α of the seventh book of Aristotle’s Physics and the two byzantine families which shape the transmission lineage of most Aristotelian texts. To this end, it establishes a stemma codicum of all known manuscripts of version α. The first step reexamines Simplicius’ testimony in order to overcome the stemmatic problem arising from it: Simplicius’ statement that there was a version β for chapters 4 and 5 seems to be mere speculation on his (...) part. This allows for the more plausible assumption that only the first three chapters of book VII were transmitted in two versions. The paper then deals with the witnesses of version α, which either transmit version α as a whole or a mixture of the two versions. H and I are shown to stem from the same manuscript ι. ι was used by E2, who famously annotated Paris. 1853 and copied in its margins scholia derived from Philoponus’ commentary as well as κεφάλαια of book VII, both of which also feature in manuscripts close to H and I. Though ι is the source of both a version α and a version β, the original version of manuscript ι was βι. Therefore, version α cannot be associated with certainty to either of the two byzantine families of Aristotle’s natural works. Although version α may come from a now extinct third family, there is no trace of such a family in either Paris. 1859 or Vind. 64, which both got the text of book VII from the same manuscript φ. In any case, the evidence points to all direct witnesses of version α coming from only two sources: ι and φ. (shrink)

Book III of Aristotle’s De caelo does not feature the Platonic concept of χώρα as a main protagonist. Through mere scarce allusions, Aristotle tends to treat it as just another concept of matter, reminiscent in many respects of those of Presocratic philosophers. In this paper, I argue that this biased presentation should be interpreted as Aristotle’s implicit refusal to acknowledge the role of the χώρα in Plato’s reform of participation, which is expounded in the Timaeus. I refer this refusal to (...) Aristotle’s complex epistemological and methodological criticisms of Platonic paradigmatism. Reconstructing this implicit dialogue between Plato and Aristotle also sheds a new light on the stakes and consistency of book III of De caelo, which had remained elusive in earlier approaches. I suggest that book III does not aim to propose a consistent account of the four elements or of generation, but to build a new Aristotelian framework as an answer to the aporiai of Plato’s Timaeus. (shrink)

The principle of mandatory prosecution (MP) is respected, extensively applied, and has a long-standing tradition in continental European countries, and it is highly valued in socialist nations. However, in recent decades, there has been a notable shift in its implementation within these countries, with numerous studies reflecting this change by presenting diverse perspectives on the necessity to alter, modify, or preserve this principle. One of the primary aims of this paper is to examine the scope of research on responses to (...) MP and the main reasons for maintaining or renewing MP highlighted in related publications. This paper employed a systematic literature review (SLR) to search the Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) databases, compiling a total of 28 papers spanning 50 years. These articles cover a wide range of countries and diverse jurisdictions currently applying either MP or discretionary prosecution (DP) principles. Furthermore, the literature review includes various arguments and discussions on how countries should respond to MP. Findings indicate that MP persists due to its enduring values, such as legality and equality, alongside its significant role in safeguarding the criminal justice system against arbitrariness and abuse of power. Our paper also reveals that the tendency to renew or replace MP is influenced not only by conflicting opinions but also by political factors and the consideration of victims’ discretion in certain offenses, particularly in cases of domestic violence. Additionally, three options for reconciling MP and DP principles are proposed to aid readers in understanding the transition process between these two fundamental principles. Ultimately, the paper advocates for further research on MP in current or former socialist countries, where applicable. (shrink)

Zheng zhi zi you shi wei zi you si xiang di yi yi. Ran er, Zhongguo xian dai zheng zhi zi you guan nian shi ru he dan sheng de zhe ge hua ti tai da, wo men guan zhu de shi ta yu xian Qin zhu zi si xiang zhi jian de guan xi he ru. Ben shu yi shi jian, pai bie wei xian suo, yi lun ti, fan chou he nei zai jie gou wei mai luo, jie (...) he Zhongguo xian dai si xiang jia lun ji zheng zhi zi you he xian Qin zhu zi guan xi de ju ti yan lun, lai tao lun Zhongguo xian dai zheng zhi zi you guan ji qi yu xian Qin zhu zi guan xi, miao mo chu duo ceng ci, duo yuan hua de Zhongguo xian dai zheng zhi zi you lun de bo lan zhuang kuo de si xiang hua mian. (shrink)

L'art, loin des habitudes qui figent tout réel élan créateur, est la jeunesse du monde. Il a tout à créer. Tout à construire, tout à proposer. Les temps de l'art mimétique comme ceux de l'art visionnaire sont révolus, pour laisser place à ceux de l'intuition. Cet ouvrage revendique ainsi la liberté de s'imposer des règles, de nouvelles règles et préconise un art de l'intuition, un art de la sensibilité, qui puisse s'exprimer avec spontanéité, une spontanéité qu'il n'est possible d'obtenir qu'après (...) un long travail. L'art ne doit plus être pensé comme une intention. Suivant ce principe, le scénario dans le récit doit être abandonné. Du point de vue de la forme, la poésie doit pouvoir mélanger dans le même poème vers libres. vers en prose, versets et alexandrins, selon le souhait du poète. De même, il faut oser une autre forme de peinture, qui ne soit ni figurative, ni abstraite, mais intuitive, née du flou ou de l'éblouissement, de la fulgurance intuitive! Franchir les frontières, à commencer par celles de l'intolérance, en faisant dialoguer et se croiser différentes disciplines artistiques, pour aller vers un espace pluriartistique, ouvre ainsi de nouvelles perspectives de création."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Passer à l'acte. Arrêter d'attendre. Se lancer sans filet. Dans la psychanalyse, la criminologie ou le langage courant, le passage à l'acte désigne un acte impulsif autant qu'irrationnel. Et si c'était le contraire? Et s'il y avait dans le passage à l'acte un véritable élan de pensée et de création? Et si le passage à l'acte était avant tout une manière d'accorder une puissance propre à l'étincelle de l'instant, à l'intensité de l'appel d'air? Dans cet essai, on suivra la trajectoire (...) transgressive d'une meurtrière dans un roman de Marguerite Duras, ou encore la ligne de fuite d'un philosophe braqueur de banques. Au plus près des œuvres de Chantal Akerman, Pierre Michon ou Francis Ponge et des idées de Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan ou Gilles Deleuze, Léa Bismuth propose une réflexion inédite sur le rôle que jouent les crises, les bifurcations brusques, les explosions qu'il est devenu impossible de contenir dans des existences que nous croyons maîtriser. Et si l'art de passer à l'acte était avant tout l'art des commencements aventureux? Et si l'art de passer à l'acte était l'art de vivre la vie elle-même? (shrink)

"Nietzsche et Heidegger, ça a été le choc philosophique! Mais je n'ai jamais rien écrit sur Heidegger et je n'ai écrit sur Nietzsche qu'un tout petit article ; ce sont pourtant les deux auteurs que j'ai le plus lus", dira Michel Foucault à la fin de sa vie. Puis, il précise : "Je crois que c'est important d'avoir un petit nombre d'auteurs avec lesquels on pense, avec lesquels on travaille, mais sur lesquels on n'écrit pas." Les Cours, conférences et travaux (...) sont des témoignages inédits du "travail" de Foucault avec Nietzsche. Ces textes datent des deux grandes périodes de sa vie intellectuelle : d'abord le début des années 1950, quand il s'intéresse à Hegel et à la phénoménologie, ainsi qu'au marxisme. Le jeune Foucault expérimente alors de nouvelles approches pour développer une philosophie fondée sur l'expérience et l'analyse du discours. Ensuite, après la publication des Mots et les Choses en 1966, lorsque Foucault revient avec élan à Nietzsche pour élaborer sa propre méthode généalogique, relançant ainsi son projet d'une histoire de la vérité et du dire vrai. C'est à travers la confrontation avec Nietzsche que Foucault aura construit sa propre manière de philosopher. Ces Cours, conférences et travaux sont indispensables pour comprendre comment Foucault a lu Nietzsche, en particulier au moment décisif où il le découvre. Ils sont essentiels pour saisir le Nietzsche de Foucault."--Back cover. (shrink)

Désirer vivre, ce n'est pas simplement être en vie. C'est nous laisser entraîner par l'élan vital qui nous conduit à créer, à aimer, à nous dépasser. C'est cultiver la puissance du désir qui est le moteur de nos existences. Pourtant, au quotidien, nous ressentons de nombreuses limitations - 'Je ne suis pas capable', 'C'est trop risqué', 'Ce n'est pas pour toi' - qui nous inhibent. Nous sommes souvent aussi prisonniers des pulsions de notre cerveau primaire, le striatum, et de la (...) propagande consumériste qui nous poussent à acquérir toujours plus. Comment cultiver la force du désir sans tomber dans le piège de l'insatisfaction permanente ou du mimétisme social? Comment développer notre puissance vitale sans nous autocensurer? Comment apprendre à orienter nos désirs vers des choses, des activités ou des personnes qui nous font grandir et nous mettent dans la joie? De Platon à René Girard en passant par Bouddha, Aristote, Épicure, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Jung ou Bergson, Frédéric Lenoir revisite les grands penseurs du désir pour nous proposer un livre lucide et vibrant, au cœur de nos problématiques les plus actuelles. Un ouvrage accessible à tous, qui aide non seulement à vivre, mais à vivre aux éclats"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This seventh volume of Collected Papers includes 70 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2013-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 122 co-authors from 22 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel-Nasser Hussian, C. Alexander, Mumtaz Ali, Yaman Akbulut, Amir Abdullah, Amira S. Ashour, Assia Bakali, Kousik Bhattacharya, Kainat Bibi, R. N. Boyd, Ümit Budak, Lulu Cai, Cenap Özel, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Chunlai Du, Chunxin Bo, Rituparna Chutia, Cu Nguyen Giap, Dao The (...) Son, Vinayak Devvrat, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Fahad Alsharari, Feng Yongfei, S. Ganesan, Shivam Ghildiyal, Bibhas C. Giri, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ahmed Refaat Hawas, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, Hongbo Wang, Hongnian Yu, Mihaiela Iliescu, Saeid Jafari, Temitope Gbolahan Jaiyeola, Naeem Jan, R. Jeevitha, Jun Ye, Anup Khan, Madad Khan, Salma Khan, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Kifayat Ullah, Kishore Kumar P.K., Sujit Kumar De, Prasun Kumar Nayak, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Anam Luqman, Luu Quoc Dat, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa M. Malik, Nivetha Martin, Mai Mohamed, Parimala Mani, Mingcong Deng, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Farshid Mofidnakhaei, Muhammad Shoaib, Muhammad Riaz, Karthika Muthusamy, Nabeela Ishfaq, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Sumera Naz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Nguyen Tho Thong, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Noor ul Amin, Dragan Pamučar, Gabrijela Popović, S. Krishna Prabha, Surapati Pramanik, Priya R, Qiaoyan Li, Yaser Saber, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Saleem Abdullah, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Abdulkadir Sengür, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Shahbaz Ali, Shahzaib Ashraf, Shouzhen Zeng, Shio Gai Quek, Shuangwu Zhu, Shumaiza, Sidra Sayed, Sohail Iqbal, Songtao Shao, Sundas Shahzadi, Dragiša Stanujkić, Željko Stević, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Zunaira Rashid, Hossein Rashmanlou, Rajkumar Verma, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Desmond Jun Yi Tey, Selçuk Topal, Naveed Yaqoob, Yanhui Guo, Yee Fei Gan, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Yuping Lai, Hafiz Abdul Wahab, Wei Yang, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Lemnaouar Zedam. (shrink)

This eleventh volume of Collected Papers includes 90 papers comprising 988 pages on Physics, Artificial Intelligence, Health Issues, Decision Making, Economics, Statistics, written between 2001-2022 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 84 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 19 countries: Abhijit Saha, Abu Sufian, Jack Allen, Shahbaz Ali, Ali Safaa Sadiq, Aliya Fahmi, Atiqa Fakhar, Atiqa Firdous, Sukanto Bhattacharya, Robert N. Boyd, Victor Chang, Victor Christianto, V. Christy, Dao The Son, Debjit Dutta, Azeddine Elhassouny, Fazal Ghani, Fazli Amin, (...) Anirudha Ghosha, Nasruddin Hassan, Hoang Viet Long, Jhulaneswar Baidya, Jin Kim, Jun Ye, Darjan Karabašević, Vasilios N. Katsikis, Ieva Meidutė-Kavaliauskienė, F. Kaymarm, Nour Eldeen M. Khalifa, Madad Khan, Qaisar Khan, M. Khoshnevisan, Kifayat Ullah,, Volodymyr Krasnoholovets, Mukesh Kumar, Le Hoang Son, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Tahir Mahmood, Mahmoud Ismail, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Siti Nurul Fitriah Mohamad, Mohamed Loey, Mai Mohamed, K. Mohana, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Gulfam, Muhammad Khalid Mahmood, Muhammad Jamil, Muhammad Yaqub Khan, Muhammad Riaz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Cu Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Tho Thong, Peide Liu, Pham Huy Thong, Gabrijela Popović‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬, Surapati Pramanik, Dmitri Rabounski, Roslan Hasni, Rumi Roy, Tapan Kumar Roy, Said Broumi, Saleem Abdullah, Muzafer Saračević, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Shariful Alam, Shyamal Dalapati, Housila P. Singh, R. Singh, Rajesh Singh, Predrag S. Stanimirović, Kasan Susilo, Dragiša Stanujkić, Alexandra Şandru, Ovidiu Ilie Şandru, Zenonas Turskis, Yunita Umniyati, Alptekin Ulutaș, Maikel Yelandi Leyva Vázquez, Binyamin Yusoff, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Zhao Loon Wang.‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

Hicrî IV (X). asrın Bağdat asıllıönemli muhaddislerinden biri olan İbnü’s-Seken hadis tarihinin geç dönemlerinde ve günümüzde hak ettiği oranda ve layık olduğu şekilde değerlendirilememiş bir âlimdir. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden biri, kaleme aldığı ve her biri alanında önemli sayılan eserlerinin sonraki dönemlere ulaşmamış olmasıdır. İbnü’s-Seken, genç yaşında başladığı ilmî seyahatlerini tamamladıktan sonra Mısır’a yerleşmiş, okuduğu eserleri ve kendisine has senedlerle derlediği hadisleri burada rivayet etmiş, ayrıca sahih hadislerden oluşan es-Sünenü’s-sıhâh el-me’sûra, sahâbe tabakâtı alanında ilk ve temel kaynaklardan biri olan el-Hurûf (...) fî es-mâi’s-sahâbe ve zayıf râviler konusuna dair ed-Duafâ ve’l-metrûkîn isimli eserlerini kaleme almıştır. İbnü’s-Seken, eserleri hicrî VI (XII). asır sonrasına intikal etmediği için adeta unutulmuş, günümüzde yeterli ilmî araştırma ve çalışmaya konu olmamıştır. Araştırmamız, klasik kaynaklardaki kısa biyografik bilgiler dışında onun hakkında doğuda, batıda ve ülkemizde ilmî anlamda sınırlı birkaç çalışma yapıldığını ortaya koymuştur. Türkçede hakkında kaleme alınan en önemli ilmî yazı Diyanet İslâm Ansiklopedisi’nin yaklaşık 300 kelimeden oluşan “İbnü’s-Seken” maddesidir. İbnü’s-Seken’in ilmî bir şekilde ele alınmamış olması kendisi ve eserleri hakkında bir dizi hataya düşülmesine neden olmuştur. Kütüphanelerde yer alan bazı yazmaların kendisine ait olmadıkları halde ona aitmiş gibi gösterilmesi ve bunun halen tekrar ediliyor olması, eserleri günümüze ulaşmadığı halde bazı kütüphanelerin yazma kaydı verilerek günümüze ulaştığının belirtilmesi, eseri es-Sünenü’s-sıhâh el-me’sûra isnadlı bir eser olduğu halde, senedleri hazfedilmiş ilk eser olarak takdim edilmesi bu hatalardan bir kaçıdır. Bu hatalar Arapça ve Farsça İslâm Ansiklopedisi ile Diyanet İslâm Ansiklopedisi’nin “İbnü’s-Seken” maddesinde aynen tekrar edilmiştir. İbnü’s-Seken ve eseri es-Sünenü’s-sıhâh el-me’sûra’ya dair yeterli araştırma yapılmamış olmasından kaynaklanan bu ve benzeri bir dizi hata, kütüphane kayıtları ve kaynaklar yeniden gözden geçirilerek kaleme aldığımız bu makale ile tashih edilmiş, ayrıca tarihte kalan ve araştırılmayı bekleyen İbnü’s-Seken gün yüzüne çıkarılmış, eserleri de içerikleri ve özellikleri itibariyle bilinir hale gelmiştir. (shrink)

Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory by being cyclic. Money-pump arguments offer a way to show that such violations are irrational. Suppose that you start with A. Then you should be willing to trade A for C and then C for B. But then, once you have B, you are offered a trade back to A for a small cost. Since you prefer A to B, you (...) pay the small sum to trade from B to A. But now you have been turned into a money pump. You are back to the alternative you started with but with less money. This Element shows how each of the axioms of Expected Utility Theory can be defended by money-pump arguments of this kind. The Element also defends money-pump arguments from the standard objections to this kind of approach. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.

In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we (...) would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006). (shrink)

Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrongness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act's consequences are compared with those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better (...) consequences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every act and for any difference in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ. I defend a proposal that satisfies these conditions. (shrink)

This article is a review of Tom Tyler’s CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers, a timely and crucial contribution to critical animal studies scholarship. CIFERAE is a remarkable and careful analysis of epistemological anthropocentrism – in particular, what Tyler calls a “first-and-foremost anthropocentrism” - and the ways in which animals ‘figure’ in the history of Western thought. Moreover, the text prompts a critique of ‘the human’ and the formation of the ‘we.’ As such, Tyler’s philosophical investigation or bestiary pertains not (...) only to theories of knowledge, but holds significant ethical and political implications. (shrink)

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2001.

Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality. (shrink)

Background: Nurses who are constantly being exposed to patients’ suffering can lead to compassion fatigue. There is a gap in the latest research regarding nurses’ experiences of compassion fatigue. Little is known about how compassion fatigue affects the nurse as a person, and indications of how it affects the profession are scarce. Aim: The aim of this study was to explore compassion fatigue experienced by nurses and how it affects them as persons and professionals. Research design, participants, and research context: (...) A qualitative explorative approach was used. The data consisted of texts from interviews with seven nurses in various nursing contexts. Content analysis was used. Ethical consideration: Ethical approval was sought and granted from an ethics committee at the university where the researchers were based, and written, informed consent was obtained from all the participants. Findings: Five themes were discovered: Compassion as an empathic gift and compassion fatigue as a result of compassion overload, Compassion fatigue as exhausting the nurse as a professional and private person, Compassion fatigue as a crisis with potentially valuable insights, Compassion fatigue can be handled by self-care and focus on self, and Compassion fatigue is affected by life itself and multifaceted factors. Discussion: Compassion stress and overload can lead to compassion fatigue. Compassion fatigue affects the nurse’s ability to compassion, and the caring is no longer experienced in the same way; the nurses experienced it as being deprived of the gift of compassion. Compassion fatigue implicates a crisis with potentially valuable insights. Conclusion: Compassion fatigue can be symbolized as bruises in the soul, hurtful, but with time it can fade away, although it leaves a sense of caution within the nurse, which can affect the suffering patient. (shrink)

One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago by the discovery of a money pump with foresight, which works against agents who use backward induction. But backward induction implausibly assumes that the agent would act rationally and retain her trust in her future rationality even at choice nodes that could only be reached if she were to act irrationally. This worry does not apply to (...) BI-terminating decision problems, where at each choice node backward induction prescribes a move that terminates further action. For BI-terminating decision problems, it is enough to assume that rationality and trust in rationality are retained at choice nodes reachable by rational moves. The old money pump with foresight was not BI-terminating. In this paper, we present a new money pump with foresight, one that is both BI-terminating and considerably simpler. (shrink)

According to Longtermism, our acts’ expected influence on the expected value of the world is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. There is, given total utilitarianism, a straightforward argument for Longtermism due to the enormous number of people that might exist in the future, but this argument does not work on person-affecting views. In this paper, we will argue that these views might also lead to Longtermism if Prudential Longtermism is true. Prudential Longtermism holds for a person (...) if and only if our acts’ overall influence on that person’s expected well-being is mainly determined by the acts’ effects in the far future. We argue that (due to a small chance of anti-ageing and uploading) there could be an enormous amount of prudential value for some contemporary person in the far future and that value may be so large that it dominates their overall expectation of lifetime well-being. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My (...) Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

According to T. M. Scanlon’s anti-aggregation principle, it is wrong to save a larger number of people from minor harms rather than a smaller number from much more serious harms. This principle is a central part of many influential and anti-utilitarian ethical theories. According to the sequential-dominance principle, one does something wrong if one knowingly performs a sequence of acts whose outcome would be worse for everyone than the outcome of an alternative sequence of acts. The intuitive appeal of the (...) sequential-dominance principle should be obvious; everyone is knowingly made worse off if it is violated. In this paper, I present a number of cases where one is forced to violate either the anti-aggregation principle or the sequential-dominance principle. I show that these principles conflict regardless of whether one accepts a counterfactual or a temporal, worsening view of harm. Moreover, I show that this result holds regardless of how much worse a harm has to be in order to count as a much more serious harm. (shrink)

Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.

Background: It is of importance to understand and communicate caring ethics as a ground for qualitative caring environments. Research is needed on nursing attributes that are visible in nursing leadership since it may give bases for reflections related to the patterns of specific contexts. Aim: The aim of this study was to illuminate the meaning of crucial attributes in nursing leadership toward an ethical care of patients in psychiatric in-patient settings. Research design: The design of the study was descriptive and (...) qualitative with a phenomenological hermeneutical approach. Participants and research context: The study comprised focus group interviews with nurses working in indoor psychiatric care who participated after giving informed consent. Ethical considerations: Since the topic and informants are not labeled as sensitive and subject to ethical approval, it is not covered by the ethics committee’s aim and purpose according to Swedish law. However, careful procedures have been followed according to ethics expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. Findings: When identifying the thematic structures, analysis resulted in three major themes: To supply, including the following aspects: to supply evidence, to supply common space, and to supply good structures; To support, including the following aspects: to be a role model, to show appreciation and care, and to harbor; To shield, including the following aspects: to advocate, to emit non-tolerance of unethical behavior, and to reprove. Discussion: Leadership is challenging for nurses and plays an important role in ethical qualitative care. These findings should not be understood as a description about nurse manager’s role, which probably has different attributes and more focus on an organizational level. Conclusion: Making the understanding about crucial attributes explicit, the nurse may receive confirmation and recognition of crucial attributes for ethical care in order to move toward an ethical care. (shrink)

This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

In an alleged counter-example to the completeness of rational preferences, a career as a clarinettist is compared with a career in law. It seems reasonable to neither want to judge that the law career is at least as preferred as the clarinet career nor want to judge that the clarinet career is at least as preferred as the law career. The two standard interpretations of examples of this kind are, first, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to (...) be incomplete and, second, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate. In this paper, I shall argue that the difference between these interpretations is crucial for the money-pump argument for transitivity, which is the standard argument that rational preferences are transitive. I shall argue that the money-pump argument for transitivity fails if preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete but that it works if preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate and rationally required to be complete. (shrink)

Moral obligation and permissibility are usually thought to be interdefinable. Following the pattern of the duality definitions of necessity and possibility, we have that something’s being permissible could be defined as its not being obligatory to not do it. And that something’s being obligatory could be defined as its not being permissible to not do it. In this paper, I argue that neither direction of this alleged interdefinability works. Roughly, the problem is that a claim that some act is obligatory (...) or permissible entails that there is a moral law, whereas a negative claim that some act is not obligatory or not permissible does not. Nevertheless, one direction of the interdefinability can potentially be salvaged. I argue that, if we do not require the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas, then there is a way to plausibly define obligation in terms of permissibility. I conclude that permissibility is the only feasible deontic primitive. (shrink)

Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people's well-being. Still, an alternative justification—the Argument for Best Outcomes—does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the (...) Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation. (shrink)

In 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' Donald Davidson attacks a picture of language which, he says, is prevalent among philosophers and linguists. Davidson's criticism, even if correct, is not radical enough. The common irregularities of everyday language, such as malapropisms, nicknames, and slips of the tongue, not only imply that linguistic meanings are not governed by conventions that are learned in advance of occasions of interpretation, but undermine the very idea that linguistic meaning can be accounted for in terms of (...) systematic meaning-theories. Davidson continues to hold that Tarskian truth-definitions should play a central role in philosophical accounts of language, but if the goal is to describe rather than to improve or otherwise change language, we must give up the aspiration towards theoretical systematicity altogether. In this connection, Davidson's approach is compared with those of Quine and Wittgenstein. It is argued that Davidson's unwillingness to give up the notion that meaning is systematic is best explained in terms of his vacillating between treating meaning-theories as mere representations of the linguistic abilities of a speaker and seeing them as playing a more substantial role in communication. (shrink)

It is natural to assume that every value bearer must be good, bad, or neutral. This paper argues that this assumption is false if value incomparability is possible. More precisely, if value incommensurability is possible, then there is a fourth category of absolute value, in addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral.

The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In the stock version of the argument, its two premisses state that no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the past would have been different and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the laws of nature would have been different. This stock version fails, however, because it requires (...) an invalid inference rule. The standard response is to strengthen both premisses by replacing ‘would’ with ‘might’. While this response ensures validity, it weakens the argument, since it strengthens the premisses. I show that we can do better: We can keep the weak reading of one premiss and just strengthen the other. This provides two versions of the Consequence Argument which are stronger than the standard revision. (shrink)

This study examines values and value types as well as scores in levels of moral reasoning for␣students enrolled in a business program. These two factors are measured using the Schwartz Personal Values␣Questionnaire and the Defining Issues Test 2. No statistically significant differences in levels of moral␣reasoning, rankings of values, and value types could be attributed to gender. However, eight significant correlations between value types and levels of moral reasoning provide evidence that a systematic relationship exists. The relationships are not only (...) internally consistent but also consistent with the model of values based on motivational goals (Schwartz S. H. and K. Boenke: 2004, Journal of Research in Personality, 38 230–255). (shrink)

Prioritarianism is a variant of utilitarianism. It differs from utilitarianism in that benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are. On this view, there are two standard ways of handling risky prospects: Ex-Post Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off in final outcomes and then values prospects by the expectation of the sum total of those adjusted values, whereas Ex-Ante Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off on each individual's expectation and then values prospects by the sum total (...) of those adjusted expectations. A standard objection to Ex-Post Prioritarianism is that it violates Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. In this article, I argue that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism suffers from much the same problem: it violates a sequential version of Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes sequences of choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. (shrink)

Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationally required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a variant of (...) Independence (called Independence for Constant Prospects), which shows that Allais and Ellsberg Preferences are irrational. Hence this influential objection (that is, the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences) can be rebutted. I also put forward a number of sequential dominance arguments that various versions of Independence are requirements of rationality. One of these arguments is based on very minimal assumptions, but the arguments for the versions of Independence which are strong enough to serve in the standard axiomatization of Expected Utility Theory need notably stronger assumptions. (shrink)

I show, in words of one block of sound, that, while those whose likes form a loop could stop some wealth pumps if they now did what they would like most based on what they thought they would do next, there are wealth pumps they could not stop in that way.

The money-pump argument aims to show that cyclic preferences are irrational. The argument can be based on a number of different exploitation schemes that vary in what needs to be assumed about the agent. The Standard Money Pump works for myopic and naive agents, but not for sophisticated agents who use backward induction. The Upfront Money Pump works for sophisticated agents, but not for myopic or naive agents. In this paper, I present a new money pump, the Universal Money Pump, (...) that works for myopic, naive, and sophisticated agents. Moreover, the Universal Money Pump (just like the Upfront Money Pump) also works for minimally sophisticated agents who need not assume that they will choose rationally at nodes that can only be reached by irrational choices. This enables an argument that rational preferences are acyclic, which is based on weaker assumptions about dynamic rationality than existing money-pump arguments. (shrink)

This thesis consists of an introduction and five essays on decision theory.

Derek Parfit argues that fission is prudentially better for you than ordinary death. But is having more fission products with good lives prudentially better for you than having just one? In this paper, we argue that it is. We argue that, if your brain is split and the halves are transplanted into two recipients (who both have good lives), then it is prudentially better for you if both transplants succeed than if only one of them does (other things being equal). (...) This upshot rules out, among other things, that the prudential value of standing in the relation that matters in survival to multiple people is equal to their average well-being. (shrink)